I Reporter, Banja Luka , Republika Srpska
Issue 93, February 2, 2000

"How Haris Silajdzic survived as the last unexposed nationalist in BH
and how the Serbs helped him do it"

By ZELJKO CVIJANOVIC

Serbian politicians can never be so deeply engrossed in fighting with
each other that they will not swoop down together, when the need should
arise, on Haris Silajdzic. And so - at a time when they are fighting it
out in Banja Luka with Socialists, with Wolfgang Petritsch, with
everything short of firearms, at this point - the demand for the
dismissal of the Bosniac co-chairman of the council of ministers from
the political scene has become the minimal common interest of the
Serbian parties. In the end, it's the only thing that Milorad Dodik and
Dragan Cavic will not be at each other's throats about and the final
point on which Zivko Radisic and Nikola Poplasen can agree (though
admittedly, these last two have one other point in common.) This time,
the problem came about as a result of Silajdzic's thunderous
announcement of the idea of a revision of the Dayton agreement, which,
truth to tell, he only called a "certain adjustment".

Actually, when one reads Silajdzic's Memorandum on Changes, one sees
that he hasn't said much at all that he hasn't been saying for at least
two years. There isn't even that much about the Dayton agreement that
hasn't already occurred. So what's the problem?

Bosniacism: First, Silajdzic finally, unintentionally explained Alija
Izetbegovic's Pythian sentence that "a democratic Croatia to the west
and a weak Serbia to the east is a historic opportunity for BH". The
second problem is, of course, Silajdzic himself, who is without question
the most arrogant and the most capable of Bosnian politicians and, more
important, the last unexposed nationalist in BH. How did he succeed in
this?

Because Silajdzic represents the last stage of evolution of Bosniac
(Muslim) nationalism, which flashed from phase to phase during the past
decade. To jog our memories, when Izetbegovic and Adil Zulfikarpasic
parted ways on the eve of the 1990 elections because of differing
concepts of Bosniacism, Silajdzic remained true to the former, who did
not want to the separate the national term of Muslim from their
religion. At that point, Zulfikarpasic abandoned the Democratic Action
Party, declaring that it was a party of clerics, and founded the Muslim
Bosniac Organization with Muhamed Filipovic, then the most flaming
advocate of Muslim Bosniacism among Sarajevo intellectuals.

Silajdzic also remained loyal to Izetbegovic in 1994 when the latter
accepted, along with peace with the Croatians, the idea of Muslim
Bosniacism. This time, however, a relatively shy Izetbegovic was forced
to follow Silajdzic's lead in accepting the idea of an integral
Bosniacism which, unlike its Muslim variant, crams the Serbs and the
Croats into the Bosniac nationalistic and cultural context.

That is why Silajdzic, one-time vice president of the nationalistic
Democratic Action Party, and now the leader of the integrationist Party
for Bosnia and Herzegovina , is talking about Bosniac state-founding
integrationism instead of Bosniacs as one of three constitutive national
groups. That is why, instead of Muslims, Serbs and Croats, he is talking
about "Bosnian civilization" as an example of multiethnic tolerance,
even though history not only remembers otherwise but one would be hard
pressed to find a smaller area in Europe where most people have died in
the past century precisely for nationalistic reasons. That is why
Silajdzic does not mention the Bosnian Serbs and Croats in the
Memorandum on Changes at all except in the context of the Serbian and
Croatian empire-building idea which emanates from Belgrade and from
Zagreb .

The motherland: Of course, Silajdzic is correct that empire-building
ideas do exist but how to explain that Milorad Dodik and Kresimir Zubak
would get more votes today in Belgrade and Zagreb than at home? Because
for the Bosnian Serbs and Croats a feeling of closeness to their
motherland is not something which exists only in propaganda from
Belgrade and Zagreb ; it is not a question of a single political option
or leader, even when that leader may be Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo
Tudjman. Quite simply, they are one nation, something that Silajdzic
does not even mention in his Memorandum, but likewise something that he
would like very much to prevent from having a special arrangement with
the motherland. After all, it still remains to be seen whether the
Croatian Democratic Alliance's demise in Croatia will have any effect on
the election results of that party among Bosnian Croats, who found a
vent in Tudjman's teachings for their nationalistic frustrations which
Silajdzic's integrationism simply exacerbates.

On the other hand, integrationist Bosniacism pays far greater attention
to the Croatian element than the Serbian element, and that is where the
racist declaration of Izetbegovic comes in: in order to have a strong
BH, it is good to have a Croatian democrat and a Serb only if he is
weak. Unfortunately, the reasons for this are, like many other things in
Bosnia , historical: Bosniacism without a Muslim prefix pays far greater
attention to the Croatian element because the Catholic Church, and
especially the Franciscan order, have continuously shown favor toward
the Bosniac idea, as long as, of course, Bosnia is primarily a Croatian
land. The Serbs are not enthused by this idea and so they have been
left, according to Izetbegovic, to support Bosnia and the Bosniac idea
only if weak.

Language: Silajdzic's nationalism is very skillfully packaged in a story
of tolerance and multiethnicity. Of course, this is borne out by the
fact that Bosniacs are the majority of the population in Bosnia, in the
same manner as, at the beginning of the 1990's, the advocacy of the
fundamental democratic principle of one voters equals one vote on the
level of Yugoslavia permitted many Serbian nationalists to tie their
intentions to stories of democracy.

It is precisely in this trick that permits Silajdzic to remain for
foreigners the only unused nationalist in Bosnia . Namely, he had
introduced into the language of the Bosniac nationalistic politicians
the same post-totalitarian, humanistic speech that has dominated Western
political thought as far back as 1945 and was completely adopted upon
the collapse of the Soviet Union . On the other hand, by using
recognizable terminology from that school of thought - genocide,
responsibility, multiethnicity, holocaust, denazification - Silajdzic,
as far as the Serbs are concerned, represents the ideas of those
extremists in the international community who would like to place
exclusive collective responsibility with the Serbs for what has
transpired on the territory of the former Yugoslavia . The Serbs,
therefore, not only do not have the same rights as other nations but the
Bosnian RS entity was created by genocide and the results of a
holocaust, and as such, it should be abolished.

But one needs to be objective and admit that Silajdzic's multi-culti
nationalism best supported Slobodan Milosevic by its very political
existence, survival and language, in which, since we are already talking
history, definitely nothing new has appeared since Yalta.

Scrap it: A second, even stronger, argument of Silajdzic are the
politicians in RS who would have done far greater harm to his idea
regarding the revision of Dayton if they had expressed support for it
across the board instead of creating a circus atmosphere in the
Parliament on Wednesday. Because the dilemma of Wolfgang Petritsch and
any friend of RS after Wednesday goes something like this: "Either I
will be a democrat and allow these semi-reformed nationalists to strut
to power or I will break every rule which I would not dream of breaking
in my own country and support the government of these dilapidated
Serbian reformists." That is why the continued presence of RS has been
reduced to the question of to what extent foreigners will continue to
violate democracy before they say: "Scrap it."

"Scrap it," Silajdzic would agree and that is why his idea should be
understood very seriously and not with wringing of hands in defense of
Dayton like the Serbian politicians are currently doing, nor with
nonchalant comments such as "Silajdzic is alarming the public" (M.
Banjac); "his genocidal and fascistoid ideas" (Dodik); "he is
threatening to sacrifice the Dayton agreement for a unified BH" (Dokic);
"he is announcing a dark development in the region" (Plavsic); and "it
is a great shame that politicians like Silajdzic hold such responsible
positions" (Sarovic).

This year will be a decisive one for BH and Silajdzic has grasped this
on time, tossing into the barrel an uncomfortable, yet realistic option.
At the same time, the Serbs are defending Dayton, which they themselves
say has been violated more than 30 times, and continuing to tell people
that they will not permit this even though no one who steps on their
toes bothers to say so much as "Excuse me" any more. Why should
Silajdzic himself do so? Most likely he saw them on Wednesday in the
Parliament as well.